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REGULATION OF WILDLIFE IN THE NATIONAL
PARK SYSTEM: FEDERAL OR STATE?
Traditionally, ownership of wildlife located within its bounda-
ries has been claimed by the state in its sovereign capacity, in
trust for its citizens. Thus, the states have regulated wildlife on
federal lands within their boundaries.' Erosion of the doctrine of
state ownership of resident wildlife has resulted in the federal
government attempting to regulate and license hunting and
fishing on federally owned lands. 2 This comment will analyze
state regulation of wildlife in the National Park System,3 and
explore the possible legal bases available to support federal
regulation.
STATE REGULATION
Under Roman law wildlife,ferae naturae, was considered to be
res nullius; i.e., not subject to claims of ownership unless reduced
to possession. The common law held ownership of such wildlife
to be in the sovereign in trust for the people. This "sovereign
ownership" doctrine passed from England to the colonies and
was adopted by the states.4 State ownership of resident wildlife,
also known as the "proprietary interest" doctrine, was first
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in McCready v.
Virginia.5 The case concerned a citizen of Maryland who planted
oysters in the Ware River, in Virginia, in violation of a Virginia
statute which allowed only citizens of Virginia to do so. The
Court upheld the right of Virginia to pass such legislation, and
said that the citizens of the state own collectively "the tide-
waters ... and the fish in them, so far as they are capable of
I. 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Animals § 14(1962); 35 Am. Jur. 2d, Fish and Game §§ 1, 29,32 (1967).
2. East, Wildlife Bombshell! Who Owns the Game? Outdoor Life, Oct. 1968, at 50, 188.
Brief for the State of Michigan as Amicus Curiae at 22, New Mexico State Game Commission
v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1969). Although state authorities receive the idea with fear,
others react favorably:
My proposal is what I've been calling a "Golden Trout" pass. I ...do not always
find it convenient to get a fish license on first entering a state. Often we might be
tempted to stay longer if we'd gotten a license before making camp. We need a
single license good in all states for one year.
Letter of Howard M. Bosch in Camping Journal, August 1972, at 8.
3. 16 U.S.C. § lc(a) "The 'national park system' shall include any area of land and water nor
or hereafter administered by the Secretary of the Interior through, the National Park Service for
park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes."
4. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 522-29 (1896) traces the development of this idea.
5. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
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ownership while running."' 6 Since McCready, the Court has
sustained the power of the state to regulate resident wildlife,
unless such regulation is disruptive of a federal interest or is in
violation of a constitutional provision. 7
In Missouri v. Holland,8 Missouri sought to prevent enforce-
ment of a treaty with Great Britain concerning migratory birds
alleging that this interfered with the right of the State to regulate
wildlife as reserved to it by the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution.9 Mr. Justice Holmes reflected the Court's eventual
position on the state ownership doctrine when he said:
No doubt it is true that as between a State and its inhabitants the
State may regulate the killing and sale of such birds, but it does not
follow that its authority is exclusive of paramount powers. To put
the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a slender reed. Wild
birds are not in the possession of anyone; and possession is the
beginning of ownership.10
The "slender reed" of state ownership of resident wildlife was
denounced as fiction by the Court in Toomer v. Witsell.11
The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as
but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its
people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the
exploitation of an important resource.12
Toomer involved regulation by South Carolina of boats fishing
for shrimp in the tide-waters. The license fee for non-residents
was one hundred times the fee for residents. In striking down this
non-resident discrimination the Court stated that fishing falls
within the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause1 3 of the
Constitution.
The holding in Toomer may be strictly interpreted to apply
only to the three-mile area off the coast and would not be
generally applicable to fish and game. Toomer's denunciation of
state ownership might also be limited to migratory fish and game.
Broadly construed, however, the holding in Toomer condemns
the state ownership doctrine in its entirety as a fiction. This
6. Id. at 394.
7. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230)
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
8. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
9. U.S. Const. amend. X.
10. 252 U.S. at 434.
I. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
12. Id. at 402.
13. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2.
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interpretation would require states to revise extensively their
game and fish laws to remove discrimination between residents
and non-residents. Since hunting and fishing licenses provide an
important source of revenue to the states which would be affected
by such a revision,14 the consequences of a broad construction of
Toomer are severe.
Without the doctrine of state ownership, the states may still
attempt to regulate wildlife as an exercise of their police
power-the general power to pass laws for the welfare of the
people of the state. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan'5 noted
that state control or ownership as a doctrine had been weakened:
This theory has to some extent been repudiated and the modern
concept contemplates that state control is founded upon the power
to regulate in the state the protection of these resources for all the
people.1 6
Federal regulation is preferable to state regulation when there
is a need for uniformity. Such uniformity may be a reason for the
federal government to intervene in an area otherwise controlled
by the state. Since game and fish and their related problems are
more likely to be a local matter, there is no real need for the
federal government to become involved in this area.
FEDERAL REGULATION
Since all powers not specifically granted by the Constitution to
the federal government are reserved to the states, the federal
government must find authority to regulate wildlife in the
enumerated powers of the Constitution. 17 There are two possibi-
14. Brief for the State of Michigan as Amicus Curiae at 15-18, New Mexico State Game
Commission v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1969). U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States: 1971 (92d ed.) 199, gives the following information on hunting and
fishing licenses sold by the states in 1969:
Hunting Licenses
Total number of licenses sold 21,622,000
Resident 20,600,000
Non-resident 1,022,000
Cost to hunters $95,709,000
Fishing Licenses
Total number of licenses sold 29,855,000
Resident 25,706,000
Non-resident 4,150,000
Cost to anglers $87,501,000
15. 174 F.Supp. 500(D. Alas. 1959).
16. ld. at 504.
17. U.S. Const. amend. X.
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lities for such authority: the Territorial Power and the Commerce
Clause.
The Territorial Power offers a basis for federal control of
wildlife on federally owned lands.
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States. .... 18
The government may regulate and protect its own land 19 (the
National Park System), and in so doing control animals which
might damage the land.
Deer, harming a national park through overbrowsing, were
regulated under the Territorial Power in Hunt v. United States.20
Killing of the deer had been authorized by the Secretary of
Agriculture. The Court recognized that title to the deer was in the
State, but federal ownership of the land gave the federal
government the right to kill the deer to protect the park.21
The Commerce Clause provides another possibility for federal
regulation of wildlife in the National Parks.
The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes. .... 22
The scope of the power thus granted has been enlarged through
decisions of the Supreme Court. Regulation under the Commerce
Clause may be directed at non-commercial goals, 2 3 such as
wildlife.
The Court has never ruled whether wildlife movement across
state borders constitutes interstate commerce. The Seventh and
Ninth Circuits have classified the movement of migratory birds as
such.24 The Court allows regulation of intrastate activities, not in
themselves interstate commerce, which have a rationally determi-
nable impact on intercourse between the states. 25 The effect of
wildlife on commerce is seen in hunting, fishing and other
18. U.S. Const. art. IV, §3.
19. Utah Power& Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389(1917).
20. 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
21. Such federal authority overrules state laws to the contrary by the Supremacy Clause, U.S.
Const. art. VI.
22. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8.
23. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn.. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
24. Cerritos Gun Club v. Hall, 96 F.2d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 1938); Cochrane v. United States, 92
F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 636 (1938).
25. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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recreational activities. Americans purchase large quantities of
cameras, hunting, fishing and other sporting equipment, and
travel thousands of miles to visit national parks and forests. 26
This travel produces large profits and revenues for businesses
across the country, especially hotels, motels, restaurants and
recreation facilities.27 The power of Congress to legislate under
the Commerce Clause certainly seems applicable to wildlife as
the catalyst of so much interstate movement of persons, i.e.
''commerce."
Some statutory authority for federal regulation of wildlife
already exists. The Endangered Species Conservation Act 28 does
in fact control the movement in interstate commerce and
importation of "endangered species." A species may be labelled
"endangered" (threatened with worldwide extinction) by the
Secretary of the Interior, taking into consideration the following
factors:
(1) the destruction, drastic modification, or severe curtailment, or
the threatened destruction, drastic modification, or severe curtail-
ment, of its habitat, or
(2) its overutilization for commercial or sporting purposes, or
(3) the effect on it of disease or predation, or
(4) other natural or man-made factors affecting its continued
existence. 29
Implicit in the phrasing of the statute is a grant of broad
26. In 1970 the National Park System reported 172,005,000 visits with 16,160,000 overnight
stays. Statistics on recreational use of the National Forests in 1970 showed an estimated 15,239,000
visitor-days (a visitor-day is 12 person-hours) spent fishing and 14,308,000 visitor days spent
hunting. Statistics on Personal Consumption Expenditures for Recreation in 1969 showed the
following figures:
Amount Spent
nondurable toys and
sport supplies $5,213,000,000
wheel goods, durable toys, sports
equipment, boats and pleasure
aircraft $4,219,000,000
U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the United States: 1971 (92d ed.) 194, 195, 200.
27. Restaurants and motels were found to be subject to federal regulation under the
Commerce Clause in two cases concerning the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. §1447 subsec.
d, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a et seq. (1964). The Court held in Atlanta Motel v. United States 379
U.S. 241 (1964), that the interstate movement of persons is commerce. Katzenbach v. McClung
379 U.S. 294 (1964), held that a small, family-owned restaurant was subject to federal regulation
since a substantial portion of the food served had moved in interstate commerce.
28. Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (1969).
29. Id.
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discretion to classify a species as "endangered," and thus subject
to federal regulation.
In addition, U.S. Code Title 16, sections 1-4, which establishes
the National Park Service,30 gives the Park Service the authority
to "promote and regulate the use of' the areas under its
jurisdiction, and imposes the obligation to,
• . . conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and
the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same
in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired
for the enjoyment of future generations.3 '
This general wording leaves open the possibility of a liberal
interpretation of the power. This is precisely how the power was
interpreted in New Mexico State Game Commission v. Udall.32
Hunt allowed the federal government to kill deer in a national
park which were damaging the area through overbrowsing. Udall
went far beyond Hunt by allowing the government to kill deer in
a national park, in violation of state game laws, for a survey of
feeding habits of the deer. The deer were causing no actual
damage; the study was merely devoted to future regulation and
management.
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized by Congress to,
provide in his discretion for the destruction of such animals and of
such plant life as may be detrimental to the use of any of said
parks, monuments, or reservations. 33
This statute would seem to require a finding of some detriment to
the park, but the Tenth Circuit interpreted it to mean:
In the management of the deer population within a national park
the Secretary can make reasonable investigations and studies to
ascertain the number which the area will support without detri-
ment to the general use of the park. He may use reasonable
methods to obtain the desired information to the end that damage
to the park lands and the wildlife thereon may be averted. 34
Udall could well pave the way for increased federal regulation of
wildlife on federal lands. The Secretary has discretion to
determine what constitutes a "detriment" to the national parks.
30. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2-4.
31. Id. § 1.
32. 410 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 961 (1969).
33. 16 U.S.C. § 3.
34. New Mexico State Game Commission v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 1969).
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"Detrimental" animals could conceivably be destroyed by
federally authorized hunting on a limited basis.
The Commerce Clause, Territorial Power, and the precedent
established in Udall offer sufficient legal ground for federal
licensing of hunting and fishing on federal lands. This result is
feared by state authorities:
If the Federal Government succeeds in this case in achieving its
ultimate aim, as indicated in its brief, of securing complete control
over fish and wildlife located on its lands on the theory of its
ownership of such lands, it is the fear of the states that the next
logical step will be to use this new power for the purpose of
regulating hunting and fishing on these lands and charging a
license for such a privilege.35
Although the legal basis exists, perhaps the federal government
should consider the expressed importance of control and
management of resident wildlife to the state before taking over
this field. Such a take-over would present vast new problems for
both state and federal governments. Specifically, the federal
government would be faced with the problem of establishing and
administering new federal regulations. The states, as mentioned
above, would face both the loss of a formidable sum in revenue
and the task of finding alternative means of replacing it.
SANDRA JO CRAIG
35. Id., brief for-the State of Michigan as Amicus Curiae, at 22.
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